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Abstract Punishment has been shown to be an effective reinforcement mechanism.
Intentional or not, punishment will likely generate spillover effects that extend beyond
one’s immediate decision environment, and these spillovers are not as well under-
stood. We seek to understand these secondary spillover effects in a controlled lab
setting using a standard social dilemma: the voluntary contributions mechanism. We
find that spillovers occur when others observe punishment outside their own social
dilemma. However, the direction of the spillover effect depends crucially on personal
punishment history and whether one is personally exempt from punishment or not.
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1 Introduction
If punishment alters behavior beyond those directly punished, then the typical
model popularized by Becker (1968), which highlights only pecuniary costs and
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benefits, may be incomplete. For instance, punishment could be more effective than
traditionally modeled if the observers of punishment subsequently reduce their own
undesirable behavior. However, the opposite is also possible: the behavioral
improvements of the punished individual could be offset by an adverse reaction
from those observing the punishment. It is the goal of this paper to strengthen our
understanding of punishment mechanisms by using experimental methods to
explore how the observation of others being punished affects behavior when all
aspects of punishment are exogenous.
Punishment is intended to discourage undesirable behavior or actions,1 with
effectiveness shown to depend on its frequency, intensity and immediacy (Anderson
and Stafford 2003; Johnston 1972). Thus, punishment usually conveys information
that adherence to a behavioral standard is socially beneficial and supports a
collective goal (Sunstein 1996; Kahan 1998; Cooter 1998; Tyran and Feld 2006;
Xiao 2013). Punishment therefore provides information on the acceptability of a
behavioral standard, as well as providing an incentive to adhere to it. Of course, the
effectiveness of punishment depends greatly on the group members’ regard for the
established standard. If a boss institutes a particular rule that she sees as integral to
the success of the firm, but that the employees find useless, punishment for breaking
this rule may not improve behavior and could even have the opposite effect
(Trevino 1992).2 Consider, for example, laws against marijuana use. Through the
imposition of exogenously imposed rules, punishment of other users may signal
acceptability of the behavior for marijuana users. Thus, even though punishment is
meant as a means of social norm enforcement, whose norm is being enforced may
alter how others respond to observing punishment. If a new national law is imposed
locally (i.e., an exogenously imposed new norm), local citizens who do not observe
anyone being punished for violating this law will likely learn that the social norm is
to obey the law. On the other hand, if they observe others being punished for
breaking the law, they may learn that this behavior is socially acceptable if their
relevant social group holds different norms of behavior. This could partially explain
the mixed evidence on the effect of decriminalization of cannabis use; some reports
actually find that increased marijuana punishments lead to an increase in its use.3
In other words, if the probability or severity of punishment is endogenously
determined by one’s social group, observation of punishment conveys information
on internal group preferences and thus establishes an internal or localized social
norm. This stands in contrast to situations where the punishment is entirely
exogenous or set by a fixed rule. Only in such situations of exogenous punishment is
1 See Andreoni et al. (2003), Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), Ostrom et al. (1992), and Xiao and Houser
(2011) for examples.
2 The same argument can be made for exogenously imposed laws on groups such as gangs or members of
the mafia where they likely do not believe the behavioral standard being enforced is important for their
group.
3 A report on the current knowledge was made to the Judiciary Committee of the Connecticut General
Assembly in 1997 where they state in Part 2 of section 4D ‘‘However, the increase in marijuana use was
even greater in other states and the largest proportionate increase occurred in those states with the most
severe penalties.’’ The report can be accessed via http://www.cga.ct.gov/lrc/drugpolicy/drugpolicyrpt8.
htm#Sec4D.
there the possibility that punishment may or may not signal acceptability of a
behavior, depending on whether one’s local group holds different norms than those
setting the punishment rules. Our paper is novel in that we experimentally
investigate a situation where punishment can be observed but not received, and we
do so using entirely exogenous punishment rules so that strategic concerns are
eliminated.
The previous literature has identified two effects that may result from the
observance of punishment in social dilemmas, and these effects lead to divergent
predictions: social learning, and what we have termed ‘experiential learning’. A
standard public goods provision setting should cause money maximizers to free-
ride, or condition their cooperation on the cooperation of others, but complete free
riding is not typically observed. It may be that free-riding is initially viewed as
socially unacceptable, and people have an aversion to violating social norms.4 Thus,
adding the element of observed punishment to the social dilemma may engage
‘‘social learning’’, which teaches one through a ‘punishment signal’ that some
consider it acceptable to free ride. Seeing others who are willing to repeatedly incur
punishment by not contributing to the public good could serve as a very strong
signal that low contributions are socially acceptable. Since social norms are learned
by observing the others’ actions, social learning predicts that observance of
punishment will lead to lower levels of cooperation because the benefit of higher
levels of cooperation is reduced (Bikhchandani et al. 1992).5
The second effect identified in the literature, which contrasts with the social
learning effect described above, is that some subjects react to observing punishment
as if they experienced it personally, leading to a deterrence effect where pro-social
behavior is generally increased.6 Previous studies on first-person punishment find
that subjects often increase their contributions to the public good following
punishment (e.g. Anderson and Stafford, 2003). Therefore, an ‘‘experiential
punishment’’ effect in our setting where punishment is merely observed implies
that if subjects internalize punishment as if it happened to them, they will become
more cooperative. In other words, this experiential punishment effect predicts that
observing others being punished will lead one to refrain from the punishable
behavior.
Due to the lack of control in naturally occurring data, we utilize a laboratory
environment where subjects played a linear public goods game in groups of three. In
one key treatment, subjects were not punished, but observed if someone else was
punished. In naturally occurring settings, it is often the case that the probability of
4 Note that the aversion to local social norm violation has been shown to lead to third-party punishment
in Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). This behavior is seen in other settings as well. For instance, Cooper and
Glenn Dutcher (2011) show that proposer behavior in an ultimatum game is consistent with the proposer
learning which offers are socially acceptable (i.e., socially unacceptable proposals are rejected and the
proposers thus learn the social norms. As the saying goes, ‘‘When in Rome, do as the Romans do.’’).
5 There is some confusing usage of the term ‘‘social learning’’ applied to this setting. We are referring to
the usage ‘‘localized conformity’’ in Bikhchandani et al. (1992), and not the usage in Arvey et al. (1985),
Trevino (1992) and references therein.
6 This internalization of observation of punishment has been labeled vicarious punishment in psychology
(Malouff et al. 2009).
punishment is sufficiently low that people do not think they will get caught
(Erickson et al. 2013). That is, they will behave as if a small probability of
punishment is the same as a zero probability. Our treatment is in line with the use of
such mental shortcuts, or decision heuristics (Harsanyi and John 1986), but it also
allows us to understand how social norms are transmitted in an environment free of
personal punishment. We focus on comparisons of subjects’ contributions to the
public good when they did and did not observe punishment. We introduce a second
key treatment in which subjects both observe punishment and can themselves be
punished. Varying the order of these two treatments allows us to manipulate one’s
history with punishment institutions. Experiential punishment may be more likely
when personal punishment history exists, because it can be argued that in order for
subjects to react to observing others’ punishment, they must first know how they
would react if punished themselves.
The social dilemma we utilize is the standard voluntary contribution mechanism
(VCM). Our main contribution is that we identify both a positive and a negative
spillover effect of observed punishment and we pinpoint when each effect can be
expected. Specifically, if a subject was exempt from personal punishment, then she
responds to observed punishment by reducing VCM contributions. On the other
hand, if a subject was not exempt from personal punishment, then she responds to
observed punishment by increasing VCM contributions. Both of these effects are
evident only if the subjects had not previously been exposed to any punishment
mechanism (i.e., Game 2 of our 3 game design) and both effects decrease over time.
2 Brief review of related literature
The study of punishment effects in economics has its traditions in the law and
economics literature. The Becker (1968) or Tullock (1974) approach to crime rests
on the rational utility maximization model where deterrence is a function of the
probability of being caught, and prosecuted, and the relative size of the payoff from
the crime.
Other research exposed the limits of this approach. For instance, Myers (1982)
shows that the relative means and variances of legal and illegal income affect the
supply of criminal behavior. Likewise, increased public deterrence efforts may
substitute for private protection, leading to an increase in criminal behavior (Skogh
and Stuart 1982). Spatial spillovers also raise doubts regarding net crime deterrence.
If certain regions increase deterrence efforts, therefore becoming crime exporters,
surrounding regions may experience higher or lower crime depending on the
community’s reaction function (Cameron 1988). Industrial organization models of
crime networks raise the possibility that the closure of incumbent ‘firms’ due to
deterrence efforts may raise the level of crime, at least in the short run, if competing
firms jockey for positions in the markets for illicit goods and services (Buchanan
and James 1973). It is also possible that criminal monopolies treat increased efforts
as increases in fixed costs of operation, which do not affect criminal behavior on the
margin (Holahan 1973). There are also behavioral questions regarding adaptive
behavior. As Harsanyi (1986) points out, decreasing the certainty of criminal
success from .9 to .8 may be irrelevant if individuals’ use heuristics and treat both of
these outcomes as if they implied certain success.
Note that the aforementioned literature focuses on the certainty of detection (and
prosecution) and the relative size of the payoff. Our focus is on the behavioral
response to observing punishment when these variables are known, exogenously
determined, and held fixed, which has yet to be studied as closely as laboratory
experiments allow. Furthermore, an efficiency argument, supported by behavioral
economics insights, has been made regarding how to focus resources in a system
meant to deter anti-social or criminal behavior (Harell and Segal 1999). If would-be
transgressors prefer more (less) uncertainty regarding detection and less (more)
uncertainty regarding punishment, the deterrence system ought to be structured to
do the opposite in order to deter crime. Our study contributes to this understanding
by analyzing the effects of observable deterrence efforts on cooperative behavior,
where we isolate in-group cooperation concerns by making observed punishment
exogenous to a subject’s VCM group. Another benefit of the experimental
methodology is to avoid numerous econometric challenges, like simultaneity and
bias, encountered when analyzing reported crime data.
Deterrence has been considered a sign of norm internalization where individuals
change their preferences in a Pareto improving manner due to the fear or expected
cost of punishment (Cooter 1998). Our environment allows us to observe whether
individuals internalize the exogenously established norm or not in instances where
they are either exempt or nonexempt from punishment. A crucial factor in
determining norm internalization is the respect individuals hold for the norm—if it
is considered to be illegitimate, internalization will not occur.
Prior research related to our present study of observational punishment has
focused on how subjects update an unknown probability of punishment or severity
of punishment (or both). Papers in that line of research are very well suited for
answering questions relating to endogenously determined norm communication, but
not well suited for our purposes. To better illustrate this point, the following model
is a typical specification of a subject’s utility in public goods games where the social
optimum is full contributions to the public good, but the individual payoff-
maximization incentives are to contribute nothing.
Ui;PðxÞ ¼ a E  xið Þ þ b
XN
j¼1
xj  Pr  d ð1Þ
where xi is the amount contributed to the public good by subject i, Pr is the
probability of punishment of level d. Using this model, Xiao and Houser (2011)
examine how the observance of exogenously imposed punishment to fellow group
members affects contributions.7 In their study, they used a repeated linear public
goods game where rounds were monitored with probability of 50 %. If a round was
7 We note that Xiao and Houser (2011) was well designed to answer their research question about how
public punishment conveys localized cooperative norms better than private punishment. Our outline here
is to merely highlight the differences in their design and our own in that theirs relies partially on
endogenous punishment factors while ours does not. Thus, the environments they address and the ones we
address are quite different.
monitored, the subject who contributed the lowest amount was punished and the
punishment severity was larger the farther the subject was from the average con-
tribution level of his/her other group members. So, subjects can be assumed to be
maximizing their utility given uncertainty about Pr and d. Importantly, because the
lowest contributor was punished and the severity of the punishment is a function of
one’s group members’ contribution levels, this key element of punishment is, in
effect, endogenous in their design.
In a similar vein, Dickinson (2001) fixes the amount of (private) punishment, but
again the punishment is given to the lowest contributors. Since one’s optimization is
conditional on a rank ordering of others’ contributions, behavior can be expected to
change as more information is gathered on what others contribute and subjects
update beliefs about the actual values of Pr and d for a given level of contribution.
Schnake (1986) examined college students’ reaction to a confederate being
punished for low output when subjects had no idea that punishment of any sort was
possible. Once subjects observed the punishment of the confederate, they were able
to update their prior (presumably incorrect) beliefs of Pr and/or d. In both of these
studies (and others like these), observance of punishment leads to an increase in the
desirable behavior. Though it is important to understand how subjects update their
prior beliefs, our design focuses on whether the behavioral effects of observed
punishment are more consistent with experiential punishment or with the social
learning we describe above, which is most easily assessed without the added
complication of information updating and/or strategic concerns.
Our study diverges from prior studies by examining the behavioral implications
of observing punishment that has no direct impact on one’s monetary payoff. More
specifically, assume agent i only observes punishment and this observation does not
affect monetary payoffs in agent i’s social dilemma. We can represent this with the
following function
Ui;CðxÞ ¼ a E  xið Þ þ b
XN
j¼1
xj þ Cðxi;PjVÞ ð2Þ
where C(.) is a function accounting for the psychological cost (or benefit) of
observing punishment, P is an indicator equal to one if punishment is observed
while V represents personal characteristics, which map the agent’s reaction to
observed punishment into her contributions, xi.
8 In essence, the personal charac-
teristics, V, determine if the observance of punishment is a psychic cost or benefit,
which in turn may lead the agent to either increase or decrease her contributions to
the public good. One of our objectives is to uncover some of the specific factors that
influence the sign and magnitude of C(.). Behaviorally, if a characteristic in V
determines that the sign of
d2Cð:Þ
dxi dP
is negative, this means that an agent should
decrease contributions in order to increase utility and vise-a-versa if
d2Cð:Þ
dxi dP
is
positive.
8 Notice that
dCð:Þ
dP
¼ 0 when P = 0. See Ku and Salmon (2010) for a similar model.
3 Experimental design
Subjects were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner 2004) and the experiments were
programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Experimental sessions lasted about an
hour and average subject payoffs were $20.46. In what follows we refer to super-
groups and VCM groups to avoid confusion. For example, if a session involved 18
subjects, two super-groups of 9 subjects were randomly formed and remained fixed
for the entire experimental session. We will refer to these groups as super-group 1
and super-group 2.9 Subjects played 3-person VCM games with other subjects
within their super-group, and we refer to these 3-person groups as the VCM groups.
Two super-groups allow us to randomly match each subject from super-group 1
with a subject from super-group 2 for the purposes of observed punishment
treatments while ensuring that these two subjects never play in a VCM game with
each other. The two subjects from different super-groups will be referred to as each
respective subject’s ‘‘other group counterpart’’ (OGC). These OGC pairs remained
fixed throughout the experiment.
In each session, there were three 10-period games played by each VCM group:
Game A, Game B, and Game C. Before each game, subjects were given written
instructions that were read out loud by the experimenter, followed by a short quiz to
ensure comprehension of instructions. Afterwards, the first 10-period game (Game
A) started. Subjects were given information only about the current treatment but
knew others would follow. The same procedure was carried out for all games A,B,
and C. Sample instructions are given in the Appendix. Game A is a standard VCM
game, which was used to give subjects experience playing the game and allowed
learning about the social norms. Subjects allocated 10 tokens to an ‘‘individual’’ or
‘‘group’’ account in whole token increments. Tokens allocated to the individual
account yielded $0.025 to that person alone and tokens allocated to the group
account returned $0.0125 to all three members of that subject’s VCM group. Thus,
viewed from the perspective of a single decision round, a money-maximizing agent
should place all 10 tokens in the individual account (earning $.25) while the social
optimum implies allocation of all 10 tokens to the group account (earning $.375).
No punishment exists in Game A, but we maintain a sequential move structure
where one super-group makes decisions first. This is done to maintain consistency
across Games A, B, and C to ensure that results in Games B and C are not simply a
function of sequential decisions across super-groups 1 and 2.
Game B was similar to A except that a punishment mechanism was introduced.
Punishment only applied to VCM groups within super-group 1 in Game B. If a
VCM group member contributed less than 5 tokens to the group account, there was
a 50 % chance of being punished by losing $0.125 (equal to an expected
punishment cost of $0.0625, or 2.5 tokens) of her period earnings. This still leaves
the strategy structures weakly intact for risk-neutral money-maximizing agents.
9 We referred to these as Group A and Group B in the experiment instructions. We changed the labels
here to Super-group 1 and 2 to avoid confusion in the text when referring to games A, B and C, which are
the treatments. In the instructions, treatments were unnamed and simply described by the rules that would
apply to each particular block of trials.
In each round of Game B the subjects in super-group 1 made a decision and
outcomes (i.e., private payoffs, group payoffs and punishments) were determined.
Thereafter, the partner from the unpunished super-group 2 is informed whether her
OGC was punished or not and how often they had been punished previously and
the costs of such punishment. Those in super-group 2 then made a decision in
their respective VCM game without the possibility of being personally punished.
We stress that, because VCM groups only include subjects from the same super-
group, any behavioral response by a super-group 2 subject cannot be strategic or
reciprocal.
Game C is similar to Game B except now subjects from both super-groups 1 and
2 are subject to the same punishment mechanism. Thus, subjects in super-group 2
can observe punishment and can be directly punished themselves in Game C. The
sequence of decisions was the same. Subjects played all three games in a single
session where Game A was always played first. To control for order effects across
games, half the sessions were ran in game order ABC and half in order ACB.
Counterbalancing the game order for Games B and C is also necessary to generate
the differential punishment history needed.
In summary, the main goal of the design was to tightly control what was learned
from observing punishment in order to clearly identify the effects without data
complications found in other studies (which, to be fair, were designed to answer
somewhat different questions). Specifically, the design we implemented precludes
conditional cooperation, updating of the probability of punishment and/or strategic
learning as a potential cause of behavioral changes due to the observance of OGC
punishment.
4 Results
Eight sessions—four with game order ABC and four with game order ACB—were
run at a large American university. In total there were 144 subjects. It turns out that
the game order matters because our results show that the lack of experience or
history with punishment institutions is necessary for punishment spillover effects to
display among those players in super-group 2. In our description of results that
follow, recall that in Game B, subjects from super-group 2 were exempt from
punishment whereas in Game C they were non-exempt and subject to punishment
themselves.
4.1 Overview
Figures 1, 2, and 3 give an overview of the results at the more aggregate level. In the
related statistical tests of the pooled data, the unit of observation is the individual,
though many would consider that independent observations in a VCM context only
occur at the session level. For this reason, we intend for the results derived from
Figs. 1, 2, and 3 to merely give some indication of the tendencies in the data. We are
more careful to control for other relevant factors and non-independence of errors
(across periods for a given subject) in the multi-variate analysis that follows. We
should highlight, however, that our results are strengthened by the more proper
econometric analysis that we will show in Tables 1 and 2, which are used to
produce Fig. 4 as well.
Fig. 1 Mean contributions. Mean contributions in all games by super-group over time
Fig. 2 Mean change in contributions Conditional on personal punishment. The mean change in
contributions of both super-groups in both games the period after a subject was or was not personally
punished
Figure 1 shows the average contributions each period of those in super-group 1
compared to super-group 2 in Games A, B and C. In Game A, the average
contribution of those in super-group 1 (2.37 tokens) is close to the average
contributions of those in super-group 2 (2.28; p value = 0.76).10 The typical decay
over time is also seen as both groups contribute more in the first few periods than in
Fig. 3 Mean change in contributions of super-group 2. The mean change in contributions of super-group
2 conditional on game and game order
Table 1 Change in cooperation (Game B)
Variables (1) (2)
ABC ACB
OGC punished -1.70** (0.69) 0.73 (0.85)
OGC punished 9 period 0.17* (0.09) -0.15 (0.11)
Period 0.04 (0.04) 0.04 (0.04)
Others’ contributions previous period 0.06* (0.04) 0.01 (0.04)
Subject’s first period contribution -0.05* (0.03) -0.02 (0.02)
Constant -0.32 (0.26) -0.28 (0.31)
Observations 324 324
Number of subject 36 36
Random effects panel regression of cooperation of super-group 2 subjects in Game B
Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level and appear in parentheses
*** p \ 0.01, ** p \ 0.05, * p \ 0.1
10 Unless denoted otherwise, the p values are the result of a two-sided t test where standard errors are
clustered by subject to control for the obvious non-independence of observations over time.
the last few. Game B shows a much different results. Those in super-group 1
contribute much more (3.88) than those in super-Group 2 (1.51; p value = 0.00).
Thus, the potential punishment in Game B, which is only applied to super-group 1,
increases cooperation. Finally, we can see that in Game C average contributions
from both super-groups are very similar; those in super-group 1 contributed 4.08
while those in super-group 2 contributed 4.32 (p value = 0.42).
Table 2 Change in cooperation (Game C)
Variables (1) (2)
ABC ACB
OGC punished 0.40 (0.82) 1.85** (0.93)
OGC punished 9 period -0.15 (0.14) -0.36** (0.18)
Period 0.03 (0.04) 0.02 (0.05)
Personally punished last period 3.23*** (0.65) 2.19*** (0.61)
Others’ contributions previous period 0.04* (0.02) 0.01 (0.03)
Subject’s first period contribution -0.05 (0.04) 0.04 (0.03)
Constant -0.71* (0.40) -0.70* (0.38)
Observations 324 324
Number of subject 36 36
Random effects panel regression of cooperation of super-group 2 subjects in Game C
Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level and appear in parentheses
*** p \ 0.01, ** p \ 0.05, * p \ 0.1
Fig. 4 Predicted change in contributions of super-group 2 resulting from OGC punishment. Predicted
outcomes based on random effects panel estimations (see Tables 1, 2) using robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level. Bars indicate the 95 % confidence interval
Before going to our main results of observed punishment, we highlight in Fig. 2
the direct effect of personal punishment. Figure 2 shows the change in subject
contributions from period t - 1 to period t as a function of being personally
punished in period t - 1, and it shows that being punished increases contributions.
Across all periods (2–10), those in super-group 1 who were punished in round t - 1
contributed 1.87 more the next period (p value = 0.00) in Game B and 2.41 more (p
value = 0.00) in Game C than their super-group counterparts who were not
punished in period t - 1. Likewise, those in super-group 2 who were punished in
round t - 1 contributed 2.24 more across all periods (p value = 0.00) in Game C
compared to those who were not punished.
4.2 Game B results
Our primary interest is in the behavioral changes of super-group 2 upon observing
OGC punishment. Figure 3 shows the change in cooperation in Games B in the
upper half and C in the lower half from period t - 1 to period t for subjects in
super-group 2 conditional on the game order and if they observed their OGC
punishment. Looking first at the upper panel of Fig. 3 highlighting Game B results,
we find that those who did not observe OGC punishment in game order ABC had a
slight increase in contributions (0.03 tokens). However, those in Game B who
observed OGC punishment in game order ABC decreased their contributions by an
average of 0.62 tokens. This difference is statistically significant (p value = 0.079)
and the decrease in contributions is also economically substantial given that the
average contribution in Game B was 1.51 tokens. This effect is seen to be the most
pronounced initially and dies off by period 10. For those in the ACB game order,
there appears to be little difference between those who observed OGC punishment
(-0.20) and those who did not (-0.25; p value = 0.885) in Game B.
The above simple analysis suggests that in Game B, observation of OGC
punishment has a negative effect on cooperation in the ABC condition, but does not
affect those in the ACB condition. To put this finding on firmer statistical grounds,
we will turn to regression analysis that controls for other co-variates. Figure 4
displays the predicted change in cooperation (measured in tokens) when OGC
punishment is observed. These are predicted changes from one period to the next
when punishment has been observed relative to when punishment has not been
observed. Thus, positive (negative) changes indicate that a subject who observed
OGC punishment increased (decreased) her contributions from the previous period
compared to one who did not observe OGC punishment. We want to highlight how
punishment spillovers change overtime, so three periods (1, 5 and 10) are displayed.
These predictions are based on the random effects panel regressions, the results of
which are displayed in Table 1.11 Note that we control for the level of cooperation
among an individual’s group members in the previous period. The fitted model uses
our observed sample to predict cooperation as a function of two key variables in
11 We estimated the regression models for the ABC and ACB conditions separately to make
interpretations simple since the data gathered from these two settings are vastly different. If the
regressions are combined and the appropriate triple interaction effects are included, the same result
emerges. This also motivated us to separate Game B and Game C analysis.
Fig. 3 observed punishment and the period within the game. The predictions seen
below are the average predicted levels of cooperation at different periods assuming
punishment has been observed. We will address the predictions first and then move
to the regression estimates to support our conclusions.
The upper panels of Fig. 4 show the predicted changes in cooperation from Game
B. The left panel shows those from the ABC condition; the right shows those from
the ACB condition. The results from the ABC condition indicate a negative effect
from observed punishment on cooperation that shrinks as punishment is observed
later in the game. We take this to mean that subjects who observed punishment
significantly decreased their contribution levels early in the game, but this effect of
observed punishment dissipates over time and is no longer significant in the final
periods of Game B. The finding that subjects are predicted to decrease their relative
contributions in the first round by 2 tokens is notable. The average contribution in
the first round was 2.6 tokens, meaning those who observed punishment contributed
only 0.6 tokens, or 77 % less than the average subject.
On the other hand, as previously noted, observed punishment had a statistically
insignificant impact on the predicted cooperation of subjects in game B from the
ACB condition. Recall that these subjects have already played Game C where the
punishment rules were simultaneously in place in the OGC’s VCM group as well as
in their own. We take this to mean that once one has had experience with
punishment institutions in a previous treatment, the spillover effects of observing
punishment disappear. Of course, history of play in game C implies history both
with observing punishment as well as being personally non-exempt from
punishment. Because of this, results from game B alone cannot pinpoint which
dimension of punishment history is most important. However, we will show in the
next section on game C results that observed punishment effects also disappear in
game C of the ABC order. Thus, experiencing punishment history of any sort (i.e.,
past observance of others’ punishment or past experience of being non-exempt from
punishment) eliminates the estimated spillover effects of observed punishment.
Figure 4 is based on Table 1, which displays the random effect estimations from
regressing the change in cooperation (measured in tokens) on key covariates
including the observation of OGC punishment and its effect over time.12 The
variable OGC punished indicates whether the subject observed OGC punishment in
the current period. Other independent variables include the contributions of the
other players in the previous period’s VCM group as well as the subject’s first
period contribution, which proxies for an individual’s cooperative nature. The
results from the ABC condition are in column 1 and column 2 displays the results
from the ACB condition. The key result is that observing punishment leads to a
negative change in contributions from the previous period in the ABC condition.
Result 1 Super-group 2 subjects in the ABC condition respond to observed
punishment in Game B by decreasing their cooperation. This response shrinks over
time. This is consistent with a short-term social learning effect. Those from the ACB
12 In some sessions, subjects had the chance to briefly chat with their OGC. This had no effect on our
results and thus we pool the data. These regressions are available upon request.
condition are unaffected by observed punishment in Game B, which indicates that
history with punishment eliminates this effect.
4.3 Game C results
We now explore what insights Game C can provide. In particular, we are interested
in understanding the behavior of super-group 2 subjects from the ACB condition
because their first exposure to punishment occurred in Game C. The lower panel in
Fig. 3 displays the changes in contributions conditional on the game order and if the
subject observed OGC punishment. For those subjects in the ABC treatment, no
difference in the change in cooperation is found between those who observed OGC
punishment (0.05) and those who did not in Game C (0.42; p value = 0.404). The
same is not true in Game C for subjects in the ACB treatment. Those who observed
OGC punishment decreased their contributions by 0.73 while those who did not
observe OGC punishment increased their contributions by 0.25 (p value = 0.028).
Once again, this result is not constant over time as the effect seems to be the
strongest in the later periods. Thus based on Fig. 3, we would expect an initial
positive response to observance of OGC punishment, but a negative sign on the
interaction of OGC punishment with period.
We once again turn to regressions for a more careful analysis. The lower panel of
Fig. 4 displays similar predicted changes in cooperation for the ABC and ACB
conditions using Game C results. The underlying regression results are found in
Table 2; however, the underlying models now include an indicator variable
controlling for whether the subject was personally punished in the previous period.
As already highlighted, personal punishment leads to a significant increase in
cooperation as one would expect. This is a clear indication that subjects respond to
being personally punished by increasing their contributions, and it is important to
control for this effect in the Game C analysis of OGC punishment effects.
In Fig. 4 we see that subjects in Game C in the ACB condition responded to OGC
punishment by significantly increasing their contributions. Likewise, this effect
diminishes with time to the point that the predicted change in cooperative behavior
becomes negative. We take this to mean that observed punishment led to a positive
spillover effect when these subjects were also exposed to the possibility of personal
punishment. This experiential punishment effect diminishes over time and was no
longer present when they entered Game B where they were exempt from
punishment in their own VCM group. Our results indicate that a necessary
condition for experiential punishment to arise is non-exemption from punishment.
This result is intuitive and encouraging if sanctions are meant to serve as deterrents
for would be violators.
Furthermore, we see that observing OGC punishment had no significant effect on
cooperation for those in the ABC condition during Game C. In this case, recall that
Game C is the last treatment of the experiment for these subjects and we previously
saw that the negative ‘‘social learning’’ effect of observed punishment in Game B
diminished over time. Of course, these subjects were no longer exempt from
punishment within their own VCM group in game C. But coupled with Result 1
above, we conclude that previous history of play in a punishment treatment
diminishes all punishment spillover effects.
Result 2 Super-group 2 subjects in the ACB condition respond to observed
punishment in Game C by increasing contributions. This response shrinks over time
and becomes negative. This is consistent with a short-term experiential punishment
effect. Those from the ABC condition are unaffected by observed punishment in
Game C, which indicates that history with punishment eliminates this effect.
The effect highlighted in Result 2 is very intuitive. If an observer is going to
process punishment experientially, it seems she has to be potentially subject to a
similar outcome as the subject who was initially punished. Thus, observation of
punishment serves as a reminder of the rule-sanction connection, and/or makes what
is perceived as a punishment probability seem more real. The second interesting
finding is that, not only does this effect go away, but it becomes increasingly
negative by the last round. One explanation is that subjects are learning to take more
risks by observing risky behavior. Remember, in this setting, subjects who
contribute fewer than half of their tokens are subject to punishment. Thus,
contributions which trend towards zero are riskier choices. We see that this is true.
In the first 5 periods of Game C, those who observed punishment contributed an
average of 4.63 tokens compared to 3.51 tokens in the last 5 periods.
5 Discussion
In this study we examined the basic behavioral response of observing punishment as
it relates to cooperation in a social dilemma. A priori, there were two competing
thoughts on the effect the observation of punishment might have. A social learning
effect dictates that observing the punishment of someone else, when such
punishment is entirely exogenous to one’s social group, signals that the behavior
was socially acceptable and may increase such behaviors. In our setting, that would
imply that the observer would contribute less in the VCM game. On the other hand,
an experiential punishment effect implies that observing punishment will make one
feel as if personally punished, which would lead to increased contributions in a
VCM context.
Our results indicate an adverse social learning effect exists when subjects are
exempt from punishment and have no previous exposure to punishment institutions.
This effect decreases over time and entirely disappears once subjects are no longer
exempt from punishment. In other words, they turn their attention to their own
punishment rather than that being observed. On the other hand, we also identify an
experiential punishment effect when subjects are non-exempt from punishment and
have no previous exposure to punishment institutions. This implies that observing
punishment does have a deterrent effect, at least temporarily. While being exempt or
non-exempt from personal punishment seems to be the key determinant of whether
observed punishment leads to social learning or experiential punishment effects,
these effects only manifest when subjects are exposed to a punishment treatment
condition for the first time. Observed punished has no significant impact on
contributions in game 3 of our 3-game design.
The main contribution of our paper is an experimental treatment where
punishment can be observed but not received. Our design also imposed a
completely exogenous punishment institution that removes any possibility that
punishment reflects the norm preference of one’s own group. This is important if
one wishes to identify social learning or experiential punishment effects. Previous
research did not attempt to distinguish between these two effects, and our results
imply that the positive spillover effects of observed punishment found in previous
studies can either be attributed to information updating (Schnake 1986) or to a
combination of experiential punishment and strategic concerns (i.e., Xiao and
Houser 2011).
Only by removing observed punishment from one’s own social dilemma group
and by including environments where one is exempt and non-exempt from personal
punishment are we able to identify a clean experiential punishment effect. Even so,
we reiterate that this experiential punishment effect requires one to be non-exempt
from personal punishment and new to punishment institutions in general—yet the
effect dissipates over time. After exposure to a punishment treatment, whether or
not one is personally exempt from punishment, we find no significant remaining
spillover effect of punishment. This last result implies that beneficial long-term
effects of observed punishment in the real world may actually rely on the interplay
of punishment, information, and/or strategic concerns as others have documented.
To this end, a useful extension to the current paper would include endogenous
punishment mechanisms; specifically in Game B where personal punishment is not
possible.
Finally, we note that the external punishment mechanism we used is similar to
prior work on regulation in social dilemmas. Consistent with one of our results, the
primary finding of these studies is that external punishment leads to lower levels of
cooperation. Cardenas et al. (2000) examine regulation in a common pool resource
game where they attribute the lower levels of cooperation to a crowding-out effect.
Similarly, Anderson and Stafford (2003) utilize a VCM game where exogenous
punishment was also used. They find that past punishment negatively affects
cooperation of the observers, which they link to some version of the gambler’s
fallacy. Though our design points to different explanations for a negative
punishment spillover effect, our results, taken in conjunction with these, gives
policy and law makers an additional reason to carefully consider the implementation
of regulations.
The paper closest to our own in design is Xiao and Houser (2011), which also
examines the effects of the observation of punishment. Our observed punishment
result differs from theirs in our Game B, but is similar to theirs in our Game C
environment. We have previously noted the design differences between their study
and ours, but both studies identify a positive observed punishment spillover effect
under certain conditions. In their paper, the subjects themselves had some role in
shaping punishment, while in ours they do not. Because the beneficial effect of
observed punishment is more enduring in their environment than in ours, it would
appear that having some punishment parameters be endogenous to the group’s
behaviors is a wise idea.
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